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key features for this discussion are as follows (Ibid):
- Workers can voluntarily redirect their Social Security payroll taxes up to 4 percent of
payroll   to a maximum of $1,000[xiii] annually to a personal account that can be invested
by the worker.
- Initially the available investments would be a limited range of indexed funds including
bonds, domestic and foreign equities. When a participant’s account exceeds $5,000, the
participant would have the opportunity to transfer to a wide range of privately managed
investment funds.
- In exchange for the establishment of the personal account, the traditional Social Security
benefits would be offset by the worker’s contributions to the personal account
compounded at an annual interest rate of 2 percent above inflation.
- A minimum benefit would be payable to workers with at least 30 years of contributions.
Survivor pensions would be enhanced.
- Benefits under the traditional component of Social Security would be price indexed,
instead of wage indexed, beginning in 2009[xiv].
- Temporary transfers from general revenue would be needed to keep the Trust Fund solvent
between 2025 and 2054.
- The calculations assume that those annuitizing their individual accounts will purchase
pensions indexed for price inflation.
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
Certain beneficial economic aspects are often attributed to DC systems in the literature
(e.g., World Bank, 1994), especially funded ones, versus PAYGO DB.  These include:  reducing
labour market distortions by creating a closer link between contributions and benefits, and
increasing aggregate savings in the economy[xv]. In theory, improvements in these two areas
should enhance economic growth, although, in practice, it may be difficult to demonstrate a direct
causal connection and to quantify it.  In this section, we evaluate the distortions presented in the
literature using evidence from Chile and Sweden and opine on the impact the implementation of
Model 2 would have.
Examples of labour market distortions attributed to PAYGO DB systems include the
following:
- In the absence of a direct link between contributions and benefits, both employees and
employers treat the social security contributions as a tax and behave accordingly. This may
result in evasion, informal economic activity, greater unemployment, etc.
- Favorable provisions at certain ages or based on years of service may change the pattern of
labour force attachment to the workforce, e.g., subsidized early retirement provisions may
result in an increase in early retirements by healthy, productive workers.
The FDC in Chile should have addressed some of these issues, all of which were present
under the PAYGO DB system. Because (after the transition of the old system is complete) only
employees contribute to the FDC, employers should not behave as though social security is a tax.
Moreover, since most of the employees’ contributions, (10% of the approximate 13%), are in an
account with investments directed by employees, a direct link was created between contributions
and benefits; hence, employees should treat these contributions as savings rather than as a
tax[xvi].
Nonetheless, significant evasion continues and there is a large percentage of the working
population not contributing to social security. Although the number affiliated has shownpower[xxv]. All three countries use (or propose) a different approach.
            In Chile annuities must be purchased that provide inflation protection. Since the benefit is
determined based on the accumulated funds, the initial pension is reduced in order to incorporate
subsequent indexing, in relation to price increases. During the accumulation period, the theory is
that wage rates will rise by more than prices so that contributions will outpace price inflation.
Moreover the rates of return credited are real returns[xxvi], (i.e., net of inflation) so the
accumulations will grow (on a purchasing power basis even after accounting for inflation).
            This approach would work well for someone with a full career’s attachment to the
workforce who received regular wage increases. Unfortunately, labour force attachment for many
workers is weak in Chile, especially for women, so the potential for retirement on low income,
albeit indexed low income, is significant. This effect is partially mitigated by the minimum
guaranteed benefit that provides a floor of protection for those who have contributed for at least
20 years; however, the mitigating effect is only partial because this floor is at a low level.
            Sweden’s system is quite different. During the accumulation period, pension rights are
indexed to average wage growth per capita. Pensions in payment are indexed (in part) to average
price growth per capita using a rule of thumb approximation, i.e., by reducing the adjustment for
average wage growth by 1.6 percent per year (Scherman 2003). However, for those receiving the
minimum guaranteed pension, indexing is by actual price inflation. To the extent that actual price
inflation is less than average wage growth less 1.6% per annum, the relative position of those
receiving the minimum pension will decline over time[xxvii].
            Model 2 proposed that the method of calculating the defined benefit component of social
security be changed to price indexing from wage indexing (Cogan and Mitchell 2003)[xxviii].
This would be a dramatic change that would have reduced the value of benefits earned from 2009
on. However Cogan and Mitchell (2003) argue that such a change brings greater equity among
workers with similar wage histories but who retire in different years. The minimum benefit
provides a minimum floor for the pension. Pensions in payment would be price indexed (as they
are at present).
            Whether it be price inflation or wage inflation that is to be provided, the real question is:
should individuals in retirement assume the risk that their accumulated balances at retirement will
provide adequate income regardless of subsequent economic outcomes, which they do under pure
defined contribution, or should the system collectively assume this risk, as is the case for defined
benefit? Barr (2004b) argues that during the payout period, given the uncertain nature of the
inflation shock, only the state is in a position to bear the risk. The state may do this explicitly
through guaranteeing the benefits as is the case for the defined benefit social security component
of pensions under Model 2 in the U.S. or implicitly by issuing inflation-adjusted real return bonds
that may be purchased by insurers that offer inflation-adjusted annuities as is the case in Chile. In
Sweden, indexing is provided, although the extent of inflation protection is dependent on the
financial balance of the system.  When there are financial deficiencies, all types of benefits,
including pensions (and inflation protection thereon) may be reduced through the ABM.
            In order to provide inflation protection for the pensions arising from the personal accounts,
price-indexed annuities must be available. It appears that the PCSSS assumed that such annuities
would be provided by the state through the social security system. However, if such annuities are
to be provided by the private sector, there will be a need for an adequate supply of inflation-
adjusted real return government bonds. At present this is a thin market[xxix]. The broadening and
deepening of the real-return-government-bond market is a requirement before the U.S. could be
judged prepared to implement a truly private account version of Model 2.5             Although not all commentators are in agreement, there was support for the structural change that occurred in
both Chile and Sweden, at the time of system change.
6             Some readers may take exception to referring to the Chilean system as being fully funded, pointing to the
existence of recognition bonds and arguing that such bonds are nothing more than government promises. The
authors of this paper take the view that government promises are a type of asset and that if there are assets
that in total are equal to the amount of the liabilities that the plan is fully funded. We fully appreciate that
some assets may have more risk of default than other assets, but that is an issue of asset quality rather than
an issue of whether or not there is full funding.
[ii]          Latvia was the first country to adopt (i.e., begin operating) an NDC system.
[iii]         When there is a financial deficiency, the automatic balancing mechanism (ABM) operates to reduce benefits
until financial balance is restored. Brown (2007) argues that the approach used in the Canada Pension Plan,
which requires a temporary increase in contributions and a temporary freeze to pension benefits, is more
equitable since it immediately shares the cost of financial imbalance between active and retired participants.
[iv]         The 65 percent figure refers to payroll taxes for all benefits not just retirement benefits.
10           For greater detail on any of these points see Cruz-Saco and Mesa-Lago, 1998 Chapter 3
[v]          For greater detail, see Hagberg 2006 and Scherman 2003
12           According to the 2008 Annual Report of the Trustees, these numbers have changed as follows: the projected
75-year actuarial deficit is 1.70 percent of taxable payroll; projected income will begin to fall short of
outlays in 2017 and the fund will be exhausted in 2041. These three measures give different perspectives on
the solvency of the system. The deficit as a percentage of payroll over a 75-year horizon gives an indication
of by how much contributions should be increased to provide adequate funds to provide benefits over the
stated time frame. The other two measures indicate the level of assets available to pay benefits in the year.
The first indicates when benefits in the year will exceed cash inflows and accumulated funds will be needed
to make some of the benefit payments. The second indicates when there will no longer be any accumulated
funds available to pay benefits.
               It may seem odd to discuss the PCSSS report and Model 2 in 2009, since it is now a former President’s
commission and the current President has many more important agenda items than implementing a  DC
provision in social security; however, this paper was originally written in 2006 when DC social security was
still a relatively hot topic. The authors find that it is easier to discuss a specific DC approach, i.e., Model 2,
rather than to have a general discussion of provisions that might be included.
13           This is a relatively small percentage of the worker’s total Social Security contribution, e.g., in 2008 the
maximum Social Security contribution  (excluding Medicare) by an employee is 6.2% on earnings up to
$102,000 (and the employer matches this amount) and for a self-employed individual is twice this amount.
14           Under current legislation, Social Security benefits are based on the average of the highest 35 years of wages
that have been updated to retirement, based on increases in a wage index. These average wages are then
subject to different “benefit percentages”, 90% on the lowest level, 32% on the next level and 15% on the
third level. Under the proposed reform, the wage updating to obtain average earnings would be unchanged,
but the benefit percentages would be multiplied by the ratio of consumer price increases to wage increases,
which would likely result in an annual reduction in the benefit percentages, and hence in the benefits
compared to the current law. Wage indices typically increase more annually than price indices do, since
wage increases include an adjustment for price changes and productivity and merit increases.
15           There are a number of distinctions that may be made. For example, one may distinguish between DB and
DC, among whether plans are funded, partially funded or paygo, and between whether the design of the
benefit formula is redistributive or of an insurance type (Whitehouse 2006). At one end of the spectrum, afunded DC plan with an insurance-type formula is pure (in the sense of non-overlapping). At the other end of
the spectrum, a paygo DB redistributive benefit such as a minimum benefit based on need is also pure (i.e.,
non-overlapping). However, other distinctions are overlapping in some areas. For example, a paygo DB plan
of the insurance type may be redistributive, both because it is paygo and uses current contributions to pay
current benefits but also because it is DB providing benefits of greater value than their own contributions to
those who live longer and paying for the additional value of these benefits from the contributions of those
who die at younger ages. “Market distortions” are a form of behaviour different from what theory would
predict or expect in a perfectly competitive market. When benefits are not linked directly to contributions,
then there is some redistribution, which is not what would be expected in a competitive market. Only FDC
does not involve any redistribution. All DB plans are redistributive, in some ways, as are all paygo plans.
Some DB plans and some paygo plans involve more redistribution than other plans of the same type. In this
paper, it is the type of plan that is discussed.
16           There is not universal agreement among economists on the effect of replacing a tax on employers by a
compulsory contribution of equal amount paid by employees. Picard et al. (2000) show that such a
replacement is not equivalent if taxes are non-linear and may not be equivalent in imperfect labour markets.
In the case of Chile, the total tax prior to reform was much greater than the contributions after reform, and
the labour markets are imperfect, being characterized by high unemployment and a large informal sector, so
the pre and post reform treatments are unlikely to be equivalent. If a portion of the contribution is required
for redistributive benefits, such as disability benefits, that portion might be viewed as a tax (the 3% of the
13%). Moreover, if employees are liquidity constrained, a mandatory contribution may appear similar to a
tax. In this regard, for many 10% may seem to be a high required-contribution.
[vi]         Given the highly homogenous nature of the Swedish culture, such aspects may be slow to appear.
Proponents of the Swedish system may argue that fairness is maintained because the same contribution rate
applies to all participants (Settergren 2003). But in a paygo system, which the Swedish system is,
maintaining a level contribution rate and using today’s contributions to pay higher benefits to today’s retirees
with the consequence of having to pay lower benefits to today’s contributors when they retire is a form of
redistribution. If the redistributive aspects become recognized, the behavioural responses described may
arise.
18           Effects on savings rates are behavioural responses and as such are difficult to predict and explain. A possible
explanation why NDC may result in a reduction in savings is that contributors may treat their contributions
as savings but because the funds are used to pay current benefits, there are no actual savings.
19           Congressional Budget Office (2004b) provides an estimate of the increase in national wealth by 2080 and
states that in its projections private savings would increase but it does not state the amount of the increase.
20           At inception of the system, the contribution history for all participants was available; so, although, those
born after 1953 only receive DC benefits all their contributions are included.
[vii]        Technically this reform is to “modify the primary insurance amount (PIA) formula factors (90, 32, and 15)
starting in 2009, reducing them successively by the measured real wage growth in the second prior year”;
however, it is commonly referred to as “CPI-indexed benefits” and we use this language.
22           There may be other features in DB designs that benefit women, such as permitting the drop out of child
bearing years in determining benefits or providing credit for such years. Although, it is possible to design a
DC plan, especially in NDC, that provides credit for those years. This section is not intended to provide an
exhaustive comparison of all features of the plan types that could be considered more or less favourable to
women. It focuses on the need for a minimum benefit, identifies that a minimum benefit is a DB feature and
notes that women are more likely to be in need of a minimum benefit due to their typical earnings pattern
and level.
23           This is less pronounced in the U.S. where Social Security benefits are calculated based on the 35 highest
years’ earnings.[viii]       Defined benefit plans, which provide the same benefit payout form to women as to men, provide
comparatively greater lifetime benefits to women than men.
25           In order to make benefits adequate at commencement, in DB systems it is common to upgrade earnings on
which benefits are calculated, e.g., in relation to the change in average wages as in the case of US Social
Security. Benefits after retirement may be upgraded in relation to the change in consumer prices or the
change in average wages or some combination.
26           Although there are individual accounts with actual assets being invested, the AFPs determine the rate of
return to be credited based on what competitors are crediting, on regulations and on the need for contingency
margins in periods of strong returns to make provisions to be able to augment weaker returns in other
periods.
27            If the rate of inflation exceeded the rate of average wage growth, then minimum pensions would grow
relative to other pensions. However, it is unlikely that the rate of inflation would exceed the rate of wage
growth for an extensive period, especially given the strong sense of social solidarity in Swedish culture.
28           R. Pozen proposed a modification to Model 2 using progressive price indexing. Under this proposal, benefits
for lower income earners would continue to be indexed by wage growth but benefits for middle and higher
income earners would be indexed by a combination of wage growth and price inflation, ultimately being
indexed by price inflation only for the highest wage earners. This proposal would provide for solvency on
the 75-year actuarial balance measure; although it would require transfers from General Revenue for the
years 2030 to 2078. It would result in benefit reductions for middle and higher income earners of up to 50%
in some scenarios. See Goss (2005) for more details.
29           At present, the market is thin based on supply. One would hope that if the implementation of Model 2 was
accompanying by annuitization within the private sector that the supply of real return bonds would be
increased to meet the demand for this product.
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